Considering the information given it could be stated that the “SO” example helped Socrates to refute the concept that knowledge is true belief with an account.
At Theaetetus 188a-c, Socrates claims against a suggested response to the question “How can false belief or judgment occur?” This response is based on the theory that false judgment includes making any of the four aspects of misidentification fit to the Table mentioned below (Benitez, and Guimaraes, 1993). According to the statements mentioned in the Table, Socrates argues that all four aspects of misidentification could not be possible, and so that the suggested response fails (Benson, 1992).
The four possible types of false judgment, 188b-c:
| “Something I know is something else I know” |
Rejected by K: refers to awareness and not aware of the same subject at the same time. 188b4-5
| “Something I know is something else I don’t know” |
Absurd: relates to referring to an unknown subject as to a known. 188c2
|“Something I don’t know is something else I know” |
Absurd: relates to referring to an unknown subject as to a known.
| “Something I don’t know is something else I don’t know” |
Absurd: relates to referring to an unknown subject as to an unknown. 188b6-9
Three of these asserted statements (1, 2, 3) are excepted by Socrates in 188b6-c8 due to the involvement of the contradiction that the false receiver in his mind creates at least one subject that he is not aware of. Socrates claims that acting so could be compared to erecting a building out of two types of bricks, (a) those that are real and (b) bricks that are not real. It is impossible to erect a building with not real bricks; thus if a person is unaware of something it cannot be a component of his thoughts (Benson, 1992).
This sequence leaves only one possibility suggested (1). This possibility states that the false receiver misidentifies the subject he is aware of with the subject he is aware of also. Socrates’ reason against this statement is based on the approach that the Table refers to like K. K is the concept that, for any subject of consideration O and any person aware of something S, S is either aware of O in a full volume or is not aware of O at all.
First of all and without any doubts, a theory of knowledge will have no contradiction with Socrates’ reason against the chance of misidentifying several known aspects unless it has that known aspect is a two answers dilemma: that is unless it has K.
Second: a theory of knowledge that refers to the fact that misidentifications of certain subjects are not possible appears to refuse the possibility of more than one “epistemic route” to any certain subject. It seems to argue that exists only one such route, and that this one route once followed is restrained to give access only to the subject to which it is directed.
If it is considered that objects out there in the world represent themselves things that are to be considered, it would be not a reasonable explanation why more than one epistemic route leads to them. The epistemic route that leads to the subject of consideration O will be just possessing O. Thus there appears to be an idea that any different epistemic route that is not related to possession O will be required to lead to O since it appears that different epistemic route that did not include possessing O could not have O as a destination rather than to any other subject of consideration.
Analyzing the stated information it is possible to understand the “SO” and the processes involved in this activity and realize Socrates’ argument.
Benitez, Eugenio, and Livia Guimaraes. “Philosophy as Performed in Plato’s ‘Theaetetus.’.” The Review of Metaphysics 47.2 (1993): 297+.
Benson, Hugh H., ed. Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.